A couple of questions on chronology

[Nathan G]

In general, I find the whole generational dynamics theory very fascinating, if not exciting. It seems to be taking a field that - for too long - has been considered subjective (history), and harness it using very straightforward, almost mathematical algorithms. Simply input the known history of a nation, and output everything we don't know about it, thus filling in gaps in history, and most significantly, predicting the future.

However, there are certain things that still confuse me:

First, I assume that every generational cycle (period from one crisis to another) must have an excess of 60 years (to accommodate the recovery, awakening, and unraveling eras). But some of the cycles discussed by John seem to be 50 or even 40 years long. Now, Strauss and Howe claimed there is precedent for a crisis breaking out early (such as the Civil War), thus resulting in no civic generation coming from that. But Xenakis dismisses this explanation as unsatisfactory (and I agree). Yet, that begs the question: is there a mechanism by which a crisis starts early and breaks the cycle, and if so, how does the cycle fix itself? And if the cycle isn't broken, how do we accommodate three eras of 20 years each within only 40 or 50 years?

My second question deals with the length of the cycle itself. I assume that the generational cycle is 80 years long because the human lifespan is about 80 years (and thus the next generation doesn't learn from previous mistakes). Furthermore, each era is 20 years long because people tend to have children in their 20s. However, these assumptions still seem to hold in every time and place, even in cultures where both life expectancy and majority ages are radically different. Is the generational cycle independent of life expectancy? Or should we expect to see longer eras in the future as technology increases the human lifespan?

Thanks,
Nathan

[John]

> Yet, that begs the question: is there a mechanism by which a
> crisis starts early and breaks the cycle, and if so, how does the
> cycle fix itself? And if the cycle isn't broken, how do we
> accommodate three eras of 20 years each within only 40 or 50
> years?

The following paper answers a lot of these questions:

** Generational Dynamics Forecasting Methodology (PDF)
** http://GenerationalDynamics.com/gdgraph ... namics.pdf

Generally speaking, a crisis war can begin at any time if there's an
unexpected invasion by another country or society. If the war is bad
enough, or if the population is forced to relocate, then a "first
turning reset" occurs, and the attacked society starts all over again
in a Recovery Era.

> Is the generational cycle independent of life expectancy? Or
> should we expect to see longer eras in the future as technology
> increases the human lifespan?

You're talking about the average human lifespan, and that's
irrelevant. In fact, it's mostly affected by infant and child
mortality. But no matter what the average is, there are always a
significant number of people who live to be 60-80 years old.

[Nathan G]

Generally speaking, a crisis war can begin at any time if there's an
unexpected invasion by another country or society. If the war is bad
enough, or if the population is forced to relocate, then a "first
turning reset" occurs, and the attacked society starts all over again
in a Recovery Era.

Ok, but I'm a bit confused as to how often we resort to this. You said in the cited article that this is "quite rare", and for the most part expects every cycle to be the usual 70-90 years. Yet, in the combined crisis lists I have seen, the generational cycle seems to be cut short 32 times (~10%), and not all of them are because of an invading country.

So about how "bad" does a war have to be, or how much of the population has to be displaced, for this "first turning reset" to occur? I'm worried that by this logic, one could treat all wars as a crisis, scheduled or not, and just hit the reset button over and over again.

[Nathan G]

> Is the generational cycle independent of life expectancy? Or
> should we expect to see longer eras in the future as technology
> increases the human lifespan?

You're talking about the average human lifespan, and that's
irrelevant. In fact, it's mostly affected by infant and child
mortality. But no matter what the average is, there are always a
significant number of people who live to be 60-80 years old.

First of all, I completely agree that the 70-90 years appears to be a universal constant. I'm only trying to figure out why it is a constant.

I know that life expectancy has been significantly skewed because of infant mortality. However, it is still true that "old age" in the past used to be between 50-70, instead of the modern 70-90. If it's maximums you mean instead of averages, then I would point out that there are millions of people that live to be over 100, and thousands that live over 110. In 1997, a French woman died at the age of 122. Furthermore, both the average and maximum lifespan will increase over time as medical technology increases. Will generational dynamics still hold if and when 100 years old becomes "middle aged"? That's my question.

Sincerely,
Nathan

[John]

As far as I know, a significant portion of the population have always
lived to age 80, and 80 years has always been the maximum effective
lifespan. People who live past 70-80 are not effective influencers
that would affect generational decisions.

[Nathan G]

As far as I know, a significant portion of the population have always
lived to age 80, and 80 years has always been the maximum effective
lifespan. People who live past 70-80 are not effective influencers
that would affect generational decisions.

Fair enough. I suppose that adequately explains it.

I don't know if you missed my earlier post, so I'll repost it here:

Generally speaking, a crisis war can begin at any time if there's an
unexpected invasion by another country or society. If the war is bad
enough, or if the population is forced to relocate, then a "first
turning reset" occurs, and the attacked society starts all over again
in a Recovery Era.

Ok, but I'm a bit confused as to how often we resort to this. You said in the cited article that this is "quite rare", and for the most part expects every cycle to be the usual 70-90 years. Yet, in the combined crisis lists I have seen, the generational cycle seems to be cut short 32 times (~10%), and not all of them are because of an invading country.

So about how "bad" does a war have to be, or how much of the population has to be displaced, for this "first turning reset" to occur? I'm worried that by this logic, one could treat all wars as a crisis, scheduled or not, and just hit the reset button over and over again.

Sincerely,
Nathan

[John]

Here's some stuff I've posted before:

There's a difference between a crisis era and a crisis war.
A crisis war can also start during the Unraveling era or
during the Fifth Turning that follows a Crisis Era, if no
crisis war has occurred up to that time.

Once a series of Regeneracy events trigger a new crisis war, it
gathers strength until there's a crisis war climax. America's three
crisis wars lasted 7 years, 5 years, and 4 years, respectively, so
that appears to be a typical time range. Institutional upheaval does
not count as crisis war.

A crisis war climax triggers the beginning of a new saeculum cycle.
The era time spans are pretty much fixed, since they depend on
generational changes, which are irreversible. In particular, they are
not event driven, as some claim. The Crisis Era begins at a certain
time, irrespective of events.

The timeline following a crisis war climax is roughly as follows:

climax + 0 years: Recovery Era
climax + 18 years: Awakening Era
climax + 38 years: Unraveling Era
climax + 58 years: Crisis Era
climax + 78 years: Fifth Turning

Those time spans are pretty much fixed. The only date that's caused
by events is the Regeneracy events. Regeneracy events can trigger a
new crisis war at any time, but the probability that an event will
trigger a new crisis war is very small during the Recovery and
Awakening eras, and then increases as the eras flow, until the crisis
era makes the probability fairly high. Basically, the probability of
an event triggering a new crisis war is correlated to the percentage
of the population that are in generations that survived the previous
crisis war. Thus, there are no sharp divisions between the eras, but
gradual changes that accumulate.

If an unexpected mass invasion occurs duing an Awakening era, then the
country will fight (or not fight) with Awakening era behaviors. But
if the invasion is sufficiently brutal, then there'll be a "First
Turning reset," meaning that the country will return to a Recovery Era
following the war climax. This seems to occur most frequently when
mass migrations are forced on a population during an Awakening era.


False panics vs Real panics

(First posted in 2007)

The discussion of the 58 year hypothesis has raised a number of very
good questions that need to be addressed. These are some additional
thoughts.

The main issue has to do with "false panics" (like the panic of 1987)
and "real panics" (like new crisis wars that begin 58 years after the
end of the previous crisis war).

False panics and real panics have something very big in common:
They're both panics.

And they both occur about 58 years after some disastrous event that
transformed society. This is reasonable, since that's the time that
the last of the people who survived the disastrous event are 62 years
old, and about to retire.

The DIFFERENCE between them is about the environment and the reaction
to the panic.

Thus, the panic of 1987 was a panic, but it was a false panic because
the stock market was underpriced and recovered quickly. A panic
today would be a real panic, because the stock market is overpriced
by a factor of 250%+.

The number 58 isn't absolute. The statistical term is "mode,"
meaning that more crisis wars begin in year 58 (of the saeculum) than
in any other year.

Here's the table that I've posted several times before:

.
LENGTH OF INTER-CRISIS PERIOD
Fraction
# years of total Turning
------- -------- ------------------
0- 40 0% 1T, 2T
41- 49 11% first half of 3T
50- 59 33% second half of 3T
60- 69 25% first half of 4T
70- 79 16% second half of 4T
80- 89 4% fifth turning
90- 99 6%
100-117 5%

If we go back to my original figures, and we focus on the range of
years from 40-79, then here's the distribution table:

.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
------- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
40-49 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 2 2 2
50-59 2 2 3 3 3 3 4 4 5 4
60-69 4 4 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 1
70-79 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1

As you can see, of the 100+ wars that I looked at in 2002, 5 of them
began in year 58, with 5 being the highest count. The counts drop off
rapidly before and after 58, indicating that 58 really is a special
year in generational theory.

[Nathan G]

I think I understand now.

The probability that the current era will result with a crisis is inversely proportional to the percentage of the population that remembers the previous crisis. So during an Awakening era, the population from the last crisis is very high, and thus the probability of a new crisis is extremely low. But if another country invades, displaces the population with people from their own (Crisis-era) country, and kills a lot of the veterans from the last crisis there, then the percentage (and thus probability) shifts, creating a first-turning reset. It's as if the invading country "replaces" the victim's generational cycle for there's. I can see why this would be "quite rare", as it probably only occurs during mass colonization and imperialism.

Is that a reasonable assessment?

Nathan

[psCargile]

Here's my take on the increased age speculation: Young men and women fight a crisis war, much later a minority of those fighters get into politics in their middle ages, and as leaders hold war at bay the best they can. As they age and die, or retire from office, they are replaced by younger people that haven't experienced devastating war first hand, and have little qualm about using military force to solve global problems. Now if we extend the human life span to 200 years, is it reasonable to assume that someone who fought a war in their 20s through 40s, and later became politicians, whould remain politicians for well over a hundred years to keep wars at bay during that time? Or would they get tired of political office and move onto some other occupation? I think the later is more likely. A person could do a lot in 200 years. And if their bodies could reproduce for much of that time, a single person could have many children born into different "generational niches". Governments would be filled with a number of different generations, so policies that determin war would not be held by by a majority of elder statesmen reluctant to fight.

I think that when we extend the human life span into extant multigenerations, the current generational dynamic theory would be significally altered as to no longer be relevant. It would have to be modified.