Re: Generational Dynamics World View News
Posted: Mon Feb 21, 2022 1:32 pm
Generational theory, international history and current events
https://gdxforum.com/forum/
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/20 ... gniter-rhr
Ben Wallace: Russian leaders think sanctions ‘cannot harm them’
Defence Secretary Ben Wallace said a Russian minister has previously said to his face that sanctions cannot harm them.
Speaking in the Commons he said any sanctions have to be "harder" than those imposed in 2014.
He said: "[Defence] Minister Shoigu said to my face that sanctions can't harm them. They will just either go elsewhere, or they're resilient. That is unfortunately the view in some of the leadership of the Russian Government.
"I doubt it's the view of the Russian people that have to suffer the consequences of that.
"And I think we should also recognise the consequence for the wider world of this invasion. Yemen gets about 20 per cent of its food from Ukrainian grain. Libya gets about 44 per cent of its food from Ukrainian grain.
"What would happen to those countries with rising food prices, a shortage of food, is a horrible consequence that we must do everything to avoid."
**** The unstoppable Battle of Borodino"The forces of a dozen European nations burst into
Russia. The Russian army and people avoided a collision till
Smolensk was reached, and again from Smolensk to Borodino. The
French army pushed on to Moscow, its goal and its impetus ever
increasing as it neared its aim, just as the velocity of a falling
body increases as it approaches the earth. Behind it were seven
hundred miles of hunger-stricken, hostile country; ahead were a
few dozen miles separating it from its goal. Every soldier in
Napoleon's army felt this and the invasion moved on by its own
momentum.
The more the Russian army retreated the more fiercely a spirit of
hatred of the enemy flared up, and while it retreated the army
increased and consolidated. At Borodino, a collision took place.
Neither army was broken up, but the Russian army retreated
immediately after the collision as inevitably as a ball recoils
after colliding with another having a greater momentum, and with
equal inevitability the ball of invasion that had advanced with
such momentum rolled on for some distance, though the collision
had deprived it of all its force.
It was impossible to give battle before information had been
collected, the wounded gathered in, the supplies of ammunition
replenished, the slain reckoned up, new officers appointed to
replace those who had been killed, and before the men had had food
and sleep. And meanwhile, the very next morning after the battle,
the French army advanced of itself upon the Russians, carried
forward by the force of its own momentum now seemingly increased
in inverse proportion to the square of the distance from its
aim. [Russian General] Kutuzov's wish was to attack next day, and
the whole army desired to do so. But to make an attack the wish to
do so is not sufficient, there must also be a possibility of doing
it, and that possibility did not exist. It was impossible not to
retreat a day's march, and then in the same way it was impossible
not to retreat another and a third day's march, and at last, on
the first of September when the army drew near Moscow - despite
the strength of the feeling that had arisen in all ranks - the
force of circumstances compelled it to retire beyond Moscow. And
the troops retired one more, last, day's march, and abandoned
Moscow to the enemy."
"Many historians say that the French did not win the
battle of Borodino because Napoleon had a cold, and that if he had
not had a cold the orders he gave before and during the battle
would have been still more full of genius and Russia would have
been lost and the face of the world have been changed. To
historians who believe that Russia was shaped by the will of one
man - Peter the Great - and that France from a republic became an
empire and French armies went to Russia at the will of one man -
Napoleon - to say that Russia remained a power because Napoleon
had a bad cold on the twenty-fourth of August may seem logical and
convincing.
If it had depended on Napoleon's will to fight or not to fight the
battle of Borodino, and if this or that other arrangement depended
on his will, then evidently a cold affecting the manifestation of
his will might have saved Russia, and consequently the valet who
omitted to bring Napoleon his waterproof boots on the
twenty-fourth would have been the savior of Russia. Along that
line of thought such a deduction is indubitable, as indubitable as
the deduction Voltaire made in jest (without knowing what he was
jesting at) when he saw that the Massacre of St. Bartholomew was
due to Charles IX's stomach being deranged. But to men who do not
admit that Russia was formed by the will of one man, Peter I, or
that the French Empire was formed and the war with Russia begun by
the will of one man, Napoleon, that argument seems not merely
untrue and irrational, but contrary to all human reality. To the
question of what causes historic events another answer presents
itself, namely, that the course of human events is predetermined
from on high - depends on the coincidence of the wills of all who
take part in the events, and that a Napoleon's influence on the
course of these events is purely external and fictitious.
Strange as at first glance it may seem to suppose that the
Massacre of St. Bartholomew was not due to Charles IX's will,
though he gave the order for it and thought it was done as a
result of that order; and strange as it may seem to suppose that
the slaughter of eighty thousand men at Borodino was not due to
Napoleon's will, though he ordered the commencement and conduct of
the battle and thought it was done because he ordered it; strange
as these suppositions appear, yet human dignity - which tells me
that each of us is, if not more at least not less a man than the
great Napoleon - demands the acceptance of that solution of the
question, and historic investigation abundantly confirms it.
At the battle of Borodino, Napoleon shot at no one and killed no
one. That was all done by the soldiers. Therefore, it was not he
who killed people.
The French soldiers went to kill and be killed at the battle of
Borodino, not because of Napoleon's orders but by their own
volition. The whole army - French, Italian, German, Polish, and
Dutch - hungry, ragged, and weary of the campaign, felt at the
sight of an army blocking their road to Moscow that the wine was
drawn and must be drunk. Had Napoleon then forbidden them to fight
the Russians, they would have killed him and have proceeded to
fight the Russians because it was inevitable.
When they heard Napoleon's proclamation offering them, as
compensation for mutilation and death, the words of posterity
about their having been in the battle before Moscow, they cried
"Vive l'Empereur!" just as they had cried "Vive
l'Empereur!" at the sight of the portrait of the boy piercing
the terrestrial globe with a toy stick, and just as they would
have cried "Vive l'Empereur!" at any nonsense that might be
told them. There was nothing left for them to do but cry "Vive
l'Empereur!" and go to fight, in order to get food and rest as
conquerors in Moscow. So it was not because of Napoleon's commands
that they killed their fellow men.
And it was not Napoleon who directed the course of the battle, for
none of his orders was executed and during the battle, he did not
know what was going on before him. So the way in which these
people killed one another was not decided by Napoleon's will but
occurred independently of him, in accord with the will of hundreds
of thousands of people who took part in the common action. It only
seemed to Napoleon that it all took place by his will. And so the
question whether he had or had not a cold has no more historic
interest than the cold of the least of the transport soldiers.
Moreover, the assertion made by various writers that his cold was
the cause of his dispositions not being as well planned as on
former occasions, and of his orders during the battle not being as
good as previously, is quite baseless, which again shows that
Napoleon's cold on the twenty-sixth of August was unimportant.
The dispositions cited above are not at all worse, but are even
better, than previous dispositions by which he had won
victories. His pseudo-orders during the battle were also no worse
than formerly, but much the same as usual. These dispositions and
orders only seem worse than previous ones because the battle of
Borodino was the first Napoleon did not win. The profoundest and
most excellent dispositions and orders seem very bad, and every
learned militarist criticizes them with looks of importance, when
they relate to a battle that has been lost, and the very worst
dispositions and orders seem very good, and serious people fill
whole volumes to demonstrate their merits, when they relate to a
battle that has been won.
The dispositions drawn up by Weyrother for the battle of
Austerlitz were a model of perfection for that kind of
composition, but still they were criticized - criticized for their
very perfection, for their excessive minuteness.
Napoleon at the battle of Borodino fulfilled his office as
representative of authority as well as, and even better than, at
other battles. He did nothing harmful to the progress of the
battle; he inclined to the most reasonable opinions, he made no
confusion, did not contradict himself, did not get frightened or
run away from the field of battle, but with his great tact and
military experience carried out his role of appearing to command,
calmly and with dignity."
The URL John shares is constantly updating live with more recent developments. The following headlines have been published since Putin's announcement of the recognition of Donetsk and Luhansk: