vincecate wrote:Higgenbotham wrote: My guess is in this round of panic, probably next year, the long bond will hit 8% at the same time the bills go to -8%.
So imagine someone has $100,000 come due on a T-bill. If they put it in their bank account they get $100,000. If they buy a -8% bill they will get less after waiting. Why would they every take the -8%?
It's because they want to keep the money out of the banking system and they think they will get less back from any other investment. At some point it is herd behavior taking over too. The reasoning given for t-bill rates going slightly negative in 2008 when things were a lot sounder than they are now was stuff like we want to show we have good collateral. If the banking system (including the Fed) were to get restructured in the intervening time, some of the money might be tied up and they may get less than 100 cents on the dollar. At least, that's the history. In a lot of ways, I'm keying off the 14th Century collapse and there the banks returned about 20-50% after having the money tied up for a long time. FDIC doesn't guarantee the large blocks of money. Most people think in terms of "the FDIC guarantees all the money" but they don't and maybe can't. If there's a run on the long bonds, the market is already turning the screws. I also see a lot of it as being based on the uncertainty of political outcomes.
A couple recent articles dealing with Fed insolvency that might be useful:
http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2010/10/ ... orner.html
The second sighting is more amusing. The Fed is starting to think forward to the date when it has to realize losses on all that stuff it bought during the crisis and still has on its balance sheet. Losses were baked in from the beginning, yet people at the central bank appear, weirdly, to be focusing on that issue only now.
It may be that they really believed real estate prices would go back up and now that real estate prices are falling again, they are getting worried. This shows how stupid they are. It also shows that didn't see the risk in backing Federal Reserve Notes with the junk MBS collateral.
http://monetaryfreedom-billwoolsey.blog ... vency.html
The nature of academia is narrow and specialized, so these types of sources are good to fill in details. I wasn't previously aware at all of any discussion of this.
This goes back to something else that was brought up awhile back. Martin Armstrong said the currency would be replaced and people didn't understand why he would say that. I didn't either. It could be that if the Fed does end up needing a bailout that the public will stand firm against it. I believe the new Republican Congress is on that wavelength. In that situation, it is possible that the Fed could be shut down and the Treasury would take over that function. New money could be printed called "United States Notes" or something similar and it could be required that Federal Reserve Notes be exchanged one for one or in some other ratio. If someone has large amounts of notes to turn in, they may be subjected to registration in a database and questioning. There may be a limit on how many notes can be turned in without going through a formal process. Of course, they may just allow the notes to circulate side by side. How it sorts out is a political question as much as an economic one.
A point I should make that hasn't been explicitly summarized, but has only been stated in bits and pieces. The PhD economists will say that the theoretical lower limit on t-bill interest rates is zero because cash and t-bills are substitutes and cash can't pay negative interest, that the interest rate on cash is zero by definition. That's all well and good in theory but watch what happens if the market enters into a panic state and people have to get out the door "now". As mentioned a few days ago, there isn't a feasible way to get a large block of paper cash "now" to settle a transaction. In the event of a panic, you settle in what you can settle in. The PhD economists are not taking into account: panic states, time constraints, availability of paper cash, political risk, whether notes backed by junk collateral are true substitutes as they once were when they were backed by good collateral, and whether the market will desire to hold them over time. I've stated several times that hyperinflation is unlikely until the Fed mows through the entire debt market. The last wall is the very short end of the curve and they will have to completely bankrupt the US "now" to get through it. Probably the only way they can do that is to make physical gold available for immediate settlement of transactions and there's no way in hell that will happen. There's a shortage of physical gold anyway and paper substitutes don't cut it any more than junk MBS is a good substitute for cash. This is all my opinion and I've not seen any discussion that outlines these concepts. I am not a PhD economist nor would I be considered an expert by the establishment in these matters. I think I've clearly outlined that several times in several different ways. There would be a further argument that for every seller in a panic there is a buyer so the cash settlements move back and forth equally. Wrong. The buyers will readily give up their particular funds to buy while the sellers, being risk averse, will desire to move into funds that they deem safe.
The final area to cover would be non treasury money market funds that reside outside the banking system. Some of those are municipals and municipals have come under more stress in the past week. The main point would be that in order for there to be a panic into t-bills and for the rates to go negative, the money market funds would need to break the buck significantly across the gamut. When the Reserve Fund broke the buck, that was only one fund and it did not occur across the gamut of money markets, as the Treasury was able to do a quick rescue. As long as the non treasury money market fund door is open for the most part, then t-bill rates will not stay negative.