I am heavily involved with wargaming.
The following article is an in-depth look at what wargames (very complicated ones that have been proven time and again to be very prescient) say about upcoming war with China/Russia.
https://warontherocks.com/2019/04/how-d ... a-wargame/
Here are the key highlights I was sent by a NATO contact doing wargames with European military communities:
Marine Corps War College wargame I organized that allowed students to fight a multiple great state conflict last week. Run at a high level, clearly sponsored and with officers allowed the time to engage, and with an analytical strategic purpose. Also completed within a limited timeframe of a week – so achievable. It incorporates Russia in the Baltics/Ukraine/Poland, China using the opportunity to seize Taiwan and N Korea opportunistically attacking S Korea. A worst-case scenario for NATO and the West but not unrealistic in concept.
The wargames were played by six student teams, or approximately five persons each. There were three red teams, representing Russia, China, and North Korea; combatting three blue teams representing Taiwan, Indo-Pacific Command (Korea conflict) and European Command. Manageable resourcing if the outputs were agreed as adding value to strategic thinking, consideration of capability development and operating at reach with allies. Useful for developing some detailed Red forces thinking too that is based on real world nations rather than fabricated ones that resemble the actual potential adversaries.
Students were given a list of approximately 75 items they could invest in that would give them certain advantages during the game. A fascinating consideration to apply to current and future capability. Interesting that none of the students opted for an additional carrier!
As there was not enough American combat power to fight and win three simultaneous major conflicts, hard strategic choices were unavoidable. The article only really addresses US considerations, although clearly it is a global issue.
The fight in Poland was beyond brutal. By student estimates, the NATO forces lost over 60,000 men and women on the first day (150k in first week) of the fight, Sobering!
These games were designed to help the students think about future conflicts and operational art, and not for serious analytical work. Still, there were several observations that may point the services and Joint Staff toward areas that require more serious analysis. Sets the scope but illustrates that more may be gleaned from it.
The high rate of loss in modern conventional combat challenged student paradigms ingrained by nearly two decades of counter-insurgency operations. For students, who have spent their entire military lives viewing the loss of a squad or a platoon as a military catastrophe, this led to a lot of discussion about what it would take to lead and inspire a force that is burning through multiple brigades a day, as well as a lengthy discussion on how long such combat intensity could be sustained.
To ease the students into the complexity of this wargame, logistics was hugely simplified. Still, much of the post-game discussion focused on the impossibility of the U.S. military’s current infrastructure to support even half the forces in theater or to maintain the intensity of combat implied by the wargame as necessary to achieve victory.
Airpower, the few times it was available, was a decisive advantage on the battlefield. Unfortunately, the planes rarely showed up to assist the ground war, as they prioritized winning dominance of their own domain over any other task. Its about integration in combined and joint operations. Valuable lessons to be drawn from this. Also worth noting is how the very expensive carriers were kept away from threat and would only operate lose to shore when under an overwhelming land based air umbrella.
Neither America nor its allies had any adequate response to the use of chemical weapons by the enemy.
Neither U.S. forces nor allied forces had an answer to counter the overpowering impact of huge enemy fire complexes. I ran a wargame last Feb looking at doctrine and survivability on the modern battlefield set in Estonia against a near-peer enemy. IN both attack and defence, the NATO combat brigades were found by UAVs and written down 50% plus without ever seeing the enemy. They refused to believe the outcomes “because we’re so well trained!” or the “this wouldn’t happen” delusion. We have a lot to learn about near-peer conflict after 20+ years of Iraq and AFG.
Cyber advantages always proved fleeting. Moreover, any cyberattack launched on its own was close to useless.
For those interested, the games used are all part of GMT’s Next War Series, designed by Mitchell Land and Greg Billingsley. I have found these commercial games are far more sophisticated and truer to what we expect future combat to look like than anything being used by most of the Department of Defense’s wargaming community which is often decades behind commercial game publishers when it comes to designing realistic games. In fact, if I was to fault the Next War series for anything, it is that it may be overly realistic and therefore very complex and difficult to master, and time consuming to play.