John,
There might be two different time lines at work. Taiwan clearly entered a recovery period after 1949 (recovery from a continuous war period of WWII 1938-45, Chinese Civil War 1946-49, and the initial KMT suppression of Taiwanese in 1947-48, not just the Chinese Civil War against the communists).
On the mainland, the "crisis war" did not end in 1949. The actual casualty from the 1946-49 Chinese Civil War was relatively low, compared to either the prior Sino-Japanese War 1938-45 or the misrule by Mao afterwards. The rapid collapse of KMT regime on the mainland was the result of hyperinflation and mass defection of troops and their commanders. According some theories, Mao's entry to Korean War was partly to get rid of some of the troops that surrendered to him wholesale during the Chinese Civil War; too many militarily trained youths that he didn't dare to demobilize. The civil war itself apparently did not kill "enough" of them. The big killer in Mao's reign, the land reforms, just got started in 1948-52; that alone killed more people than the Chinese Civil War. The Great Leap Forward and resultant famine in 1957-62 also killed more than the Chinese Civil War. The Cultural Revolution in the late 1960's turned the society entirely upside down, while not necessarily killing as many millions of people as the land reform and the GLF, had more profound impact on every segment of the society, especially the generations involved.
IMHO, the recovery era did not start on the mainland China until the 1970's. The Deng regime starting in 1976 typifies the post-crisis war recovery period, in many ways untaking similar policies that the Chiangs (father and son) undertook in Taiwan in the 1950's and 60's. The recovery era war would be the Sino-Vietnamese War of the late 70's, which was similar in significance to China as Korean War was to the US, a far away war with casulaty amounting to about 0.01% of the country's population, as opposed to the Crisis Wars where practically the entire population is involved and casualty amounting to a full per centage or more of the entire population.
The Maoist misrule certainly belong to the latter case (genocidal "Crisis War"). It probably has a more profound impact on Chinese who lived through it than Thais hearing news reports on next door Cambodia, whose extremist leader essentially copied Mao's policies.
China
Re: China
There was absolutely no way that these were crisis era events ornanook wrote: > The big killer in Mao's reign, the land reforms, just got started
> in 1948-52; that alone killed more people than the Chinese Civil
> War. The Great Leap Forward and resultant famine in 1957-62 also
> killed more than the Chinese Civil War. The Cultural Revolution in
> the late 1960's turned the society entirely upside down, while not
> necessarily killing as many millions of people as the land reform
> and the GLF, had more profound impact on every segment of the
> society, especially the generations involved.
crisis war events.
Land reform was a Recovery Era activity. Number of deaths is only a
minor indicator.
The Great Leap Forward herded millions of people into tens of
thousands of large communes, where families were segregated. The
Chinese people readily accepted these principles. In a crisis era,
they would have been fighting back. In a Recovery Era, with the
horrors of the previous crisis war still large in their memories,
they only wanted to get on with their lives.
The Cultural Revolution, with with kids going around burning down
universities, is about as clear an Awakening era event as you can
get.
In a generational Crisis era, the great masses of people behave and
act in certain ways. In generational Recovery eras, they behave and
act in different ways, and in generational Awakening eras, it's
different again.
There's really little ambiguity in this case. There was a bloody
civil war that climaxed in 1949, leading to a Recovery Era, and then
to an Awakening era by the mid-1960s.
A lot of people have "feelings" that this or that time was a crisis
era, because some leader was brutal or some people were suffering or
dying. That's not the issue, and "feelings" are not the issue. The
only thing that matters is the attitudes and behaviors of the great
masses of people. If you read through the web site, you'll find
numerous examples of different eras for different countries, and I've
often added explanatory material describing why a country was in such
and such an era at the time. If you read a few dozen of these
examples, you'll begin to get the idea.
Sincerely,
John
Re: China
John,
How can the "land reform" that took place in China be a Reovery Era event when it was a civil war on the ground that fought village to village, family to family, and killed far more people in the process than the previous "Civil War" which had been more or less mass defection of troops that were tired of fighting?
It's the generational (demographic) memory of the deaths and destruction that give rise to the Generational Dynamics theory, not the declaration of war or peace on paper that matters. Mass deaths over a number of years cement the foundation upon which the following generation is politically risk-averse.
The de jure civil war that "ended" in China in 1949 certainly did not immediately give rise to a politically risk-averse generation . . . partly because the "wars" in 1942-1949 China was not a climactic event at all. The displacement to an island and KMT's suppression of the native population may have proven sufficiently tramatic for all who found themselves in Taiwan in 1949. The experiece for those left behind on the mainland was quite different. China Theater of WWII became relatively quiet after 1942, and the subsequent civil war 1946-49 did not involve mass deaths, but mass defections as units exhausted from the fightings of 1930-1941 switched sides thanks to fiat money inflation and successful communist propaganda that would have appeal to a Recover Era generation. The real attritive phase of the generational war came back after the communist take-over in 1949.
This chronology may help explain a lot of the generational dynamics in the former communist bloc countries outside Europe, and nations living in their neighborhoods. Like the riddle that you were trying to address regarding Thailand. The last de jure wars they had was around the time of WWII. However, their own WWII experience was not like that experienced in Europe and North America, especially could not compare to the deaths and destruction that came later during the communist rules in their neighborhoods. It is this later period of mass death and destruction that have cemented a foundation for the Recovery Era politically risk-averse generation in the post-1970's era. Russia itself does not follow this chronology because the most brutal period of communist political violence took place there before WWII; the generational difference probably accounted for the split of the communist block by the late 1950's through the 1970's: Russia was in Recovery Era, whereas the post-WWII newly minted communist entites like China were going through their plantform burning period.
People following their governments' orders certainly do not automaticly disqualify any time period from being a "Crisis War." Cambodians were following Pol Pot's orders, and both Germans and even Americans enered WWI and WWII following government orders. Many in both instances followed orders enthusiasticly. It is the catastrophic consequences of following those government orders that provide the foundation for the rise of generation that has distaste for political violence. IMHO, generational crisis wars are a result of a generation having grown up in relative peace and prosperity embracing the myth that social problems and conflicts of interest can be resolved through political violence and coercion. The magnitude and severity of political violence and coercion builds up over time, often rapidly in the Unravelling Period, eventually leading to a massive blow-off phase of political violence, the "Crisis Wars." It may take a while to exhaust the appetite for political violence. In Europe, WWI was certainly destructive, and was a result of generations living in peace for too long and forgetting the destructiveness of wars instead romanticising about wars; as destructive as WWI was, however, the appetite for political violence was not fully extinguished until the even more destructive WWII. It would not make much sense to mark the end of the last "Crisis War" at the conclusion of WWI, when it clearly took a more destructive WWII to extinguish that European generation's appetite for political violence (and extinguish that generation, more or less, in the process helping aging along with lowering life expectancy). A new generation having witnessed the such mass destruction became archetype for the Recovery Era, with their aversion to political violence on a massive scale.
Specific brutal dictators are not the issue here; it would be hard for any dictator to carry out his dictatorial policies without a cadre of followers. The generations supporting their policies (at least initialy opportunisticly), and their subsequent displacement by more sober generations, are what make for Generational Dynamics.
Best,
How can the "land reform" that took place in China be a Reovery Era event when it was a civil war on the ground that fought village to village, family to family, and killed far more people in the process than the previous "Civil War" which had been more or less mass defection of troops that were tired of fighting?
It's the generational (demographic) memory of the deaths and destruction that give rise to the Generational Dynamics theory, not the declaration of war or peace on paper that matters. Mass deaths over a number of years cement the foundation upon which the following generation is politically risk-averse.
The de jure civil war that "ended" in China in 1949 certainly did not immediately give rise to a politically risk-averse generation . . . partly because the "wars" in 1942-1949 China was not a climactic event at all. The displacement to an island and KMT's suppression of the native population may have proven sufficiently tramatic for all who found themselves in Taiwan in 1949. The experiece for those left behind on the mainland was quite different. China Theater of WWII became relatively quiet after 1942, and the subsequent civil war 1946-49 did not involve mass deaths, but mass defections as units exhausted from the fightings of 1930-1941 switched sides thanks to fiat money inflation and successful communist propaganda that would have appeal to a Recover Era generation. The real attritive phase of the generational war came back after the communist take-over in 1949.
This chronology may help explain a lot of the generational dynamics in the former communist bloc countries outside Europe, and nations living in their neighborhoods. Like the riddle that you were trying to address regarding Thailand. The last de jure wars they had was around the time of WWII. However, their own WWII experience was not like that experienced in Europe and North America, especially could not compare to the deaths and destruction that came later during the communist rules in their neighborhoods. It is this later period of mass death and destruction that have cemented a foundation for the Recovery Era politically risk-averse generation in the post-1970's era. Russia itself does not follow this chronology because the most brutal period of communist political violence took place there before WWII; the generational difference probably accounted for the split of the communist block by the late 1950's through the 1970's: Russia was in Recovery Era, whereas the post-WWII newly minted communist entites like China were going through their plantform burning period.
People following their governments' orders certainly do not automaticly disqualify any time period from being a "Crisis War." Cambodians were following Pol Pot's orders, and both Germans and even Americans enered WWI and WWII following government orders. Many in both instances followed orders enthusiasticly. It is the catastrophic consequences of following those government orders that provide the foundation for the rise of generation that has distaste for political violence. IMHO, generational crisis wars are a result of a generation having grown up in relative peace and prosperity embracing the myth that social problems and conflicts of interest can be resolved through political violence and coercion. The magnitude and severity of political violence and coercion builds up over time, often rapidly in the Unravelling Period, eventually leading to a massive blow-off phase of political violence, the "Crisis Wars." It may take a while to exhaust the appetite for political violence. In Europe, WWI was certainly destructive, and was a result of generations living in peace for too long and forgetting the destructiveness of wars instead romanticising about wars; as destructive as WWI was, however, the appetite for political violence was not fully extinguished until the even more destructive WWII. It would not make much sense to mark the end of the last "Crisis War" at the conclusion of WWI, when it clearly took a more destructive WWII to extinguish that European generation's appetite for political violence (and extinguish that generation, more or less, in the process helping aging along with lowering life expectancy). A new generation having witnessed the such mass destruction became archetype for the Recovery Era, with their aversion to political violence on a massive scale.
Specific brutal dictators are not the issue here; it would be hard for any dictator to carry out his dictatorial policies without a cadre of followers. The generations supporting their policies (at least initialy opportunisticly), and their subsequent displacement by more sober generations, are what make for Generational Dynamics.
Best,
-
protagonist
- Posts: 36
- Joined: Fri Dec 19, 2008 3:59 pm
Re: China
I'm going to have to side with nanook here - the 1960s was the crisis era, not the 1940s. If it were so, the civil war would've led to a complete extermination of the Nationalist party, rather than just allowing them to settle on Taiwan. In contrast, the 1960s were full of purges, at the top level and below. I agree that judgement of whether a period is a crisis or not should be by the amount of trauma it causes to the general population, not by death rate, but the 1960s certainly caused a lot more trauma than the 1950s. There were massive famines and paralysis of government and even the military. This is different from Awakening era - when you think of the American 1960s, you think of hippies with their free love and drugs and peace and freedom while if you think of the Cultural Revolution you think of the Red Guards with their ferocious idealogy killing and destroying everyone and everything contrary to their idealogy. Think of the Nazis and Taliban with their strict idealogy, killing and destroying anything that their idealogy opposes - these are examples of the Crisis era, and they are all the same. It doesn't matter how young or old these people are, it's what they do that counts. As far as I could understand Generational Dynamics, a generation is defined by its experiences and attitudes, so you shouldn't automatically label an era "Awakening" just because the active forces in the era were the young, since the Khmer Rouge used mostly young people and you label the Cambodian genocide as a crisis era.
Re: China
This is contrary to the basic principles of generational theory. Trauma is a good indicator that some place is experiencing a crisis, but it is not the crisis itself.protagonist wrote:I agree that judgement of whether a period is a crisis or not should be by the amount of trauma it causes to the general population, not by death rate, but the 1960s certainly caused a lot more trauma than the 1950s.
Re: China
Okay, something is simmering in China, and John is forecasting the thing coming to a full boil. We are well aware the Chinese are major holders of US debt. So what would be the net effect of the predicted breakdown there? Would that somehow get the US off the repayment hook? And if there's any chance the US intel community thinks revolution would be 'good' for the US, how about the chance they're somehow engaged in another of their famous ''destabilization'' routines? Just wondering .....
Re: China
Wild Bill wrote:Okay, something is simmering in China, and John is forecasting the thing coming to a full boil. We are well aware the Chinese are major holders of US debt. So what would be the net effect of the predicted breakdown there? Would that somehow get the US off the repayment hook? And if there's any chance the US intel community thinks revolution would be 'good' for the US, how about the chance they're somehow engaged in another of their famous ''destabilization'' routines? Just wondering .....
US gambles freedom on risky printing press policy
David Hirst
February 5, 2009
The end of an unwritten, 15-year-old agreement brings great
uncertainty.
IS THE US not just thinking but doing the unthinkable? Is the
assumption that has underpinned the world economy since China emerged
as the new and great Asian powerhouse and the buyer of US Treasuries
over?
Do the actions of the US in repeatedly accusing China of currency
manipulation and enacting protectionist policies represent a
deliberate move to press the economic nuclear button and bring on
"mutual assured destruction" (MAD) of the 15-year arrangement whereby
China provided the US with cheap consumer goods and purchased US
securities and Treasury bonds to prevent America's financial
collapse?
The answer appears to be yes.
In what would be the most catastrophic and world-changing move in
recent memory, the US appears to be committed to replace China's
purchase of its securities with printed money, thereby moving to end
the fundamental underpinnings that have governed relations between
the
most two important economies of the world.
Steve Keen, from the University of Western Sydney, said yesterday the
US treasuries auction market was now a sideshow.
Associate Professor Keen said by way of evidence, the US money supply
doubled between 1994 and 2008 and "Bernanke has doubled it again in
just the past four months".
"The US has essentially abandoned conventional ways of raising
money,"
he said.
Asked about US Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner's attack on China's
currency manipulation, Keen said that the rules of the game had now
fundamentally changed and the US was, in expanding its money supply,
pursing a policy eerily similar to Fed policies that preceded the
Great Depression.
Keen, who last week was interviewed by The Wall Street Journal and is
fast becoming a world-recognised economic authority, outlined in his
recent Debt Watch Report that Bernanke's famous "helicopter drop
doubling of base money will be impotent against the US's credit
crunch".
Most economists believe the US and China are bound irrevocably by US
debt and China's continued purchase of that debt. They assume the US,
with 46 states insolvent or approaching insolvency, will suffer
immediate MAD if China ends the long financial arrangement.
But with the US entering a period of deflation, its economic
leadership appears to be doing the unthinkable going it alone and
letting the electronic printing presses take care of the huge sums
required to keep the nation afloat. The consequences for the world
economy are incomprehensible as China's purchases of US treasuries
underwrite the US's unquenchable demand for money to service its
multitrillion- dollar public debt, which President Obama said
recently
would reach $US11 trillion ($A17 trillion) this year.
Faced with the huge sinkhole created by the financial meltdown and
the
prospect of deflation, US Fed boss Ben Bernanke has been printing
money so rapidly that the US is being flooded with liquidity. This is
beyond unprecedented.
Many Americans believe printing money can free the country from the
suffocating embrace of mutual dependence with China. In his blog
earlier this week, Brad Setser from the US Council on Foreign
Relations, and one of the world's most respected China commentators,
outlined the US position: "Exchange rate policies can also influence
the allocation of resources across sectors. China's de facto dollar
peg is an obvious example … it is hard for me to believe that as much
would have been invested in China's export sector if China had had a
different exchange rate regime …
"Those who attribute the growth of the past several years solely to
the market miss the large role the state played in many of the
world's
fast growing economies."
Setser and others close to policymakers are realising the boom in
China may not be a rerun of the Japanese and German postwar economic
miracles but more akin to the creation of a giant sweatshop for the
benefit of Western companies and the Chinese Communist Party. But
this
required US consumers to play their role as the linchpins. Now the
linchpin has broken. There is no way the old arrangement can continue
and the US is realising the system will end. By reverting to the
printing press it can free itself from dependency on China.
The risk is massive inflation but that has never been a matter to
concern Bernanke nor, it seems, the team President Obama has
assembled. And US debt can be paid with inflated dollars. China is
onto the tactic, which explains why it is keen to convert its dollars
into iron, coal and, I suspect, vast amounts of mineral wealth as
well
as property overseas. China must act, however, while the US dollar is
strong. Don't be surprised if the Chinalco deal is but the first of
many and keep your eyes on our resource stocks. There are many games
being played at a geopolitical level and many a twist and turn to
come.
Andrew Linden helped research this article. David Hirst is a
journalist, documentary maker, financial consultant and investor. His
column, Planet Wall Street, is syndicated by News Bites, a
Melbourne-based sharemarket and business news publisher.
Re: China
Sensationalism.
Looking at the total supply of money and ignoring the total supply of credit gives one the complete opposite perspective of reality.
I don't know why this needs to be repeated so often. Can people really not grasp that in a debt based monetary system, "credit" is every bit as important as "money"?
Looking at the total supply of money and ignoring the total supply of credit gives one the complete opposite perspective of reality.
I don't know why this needs to be repeated so often. Can people really not grasp that in a debt based monetary system, "credit" is every bit as important as "money"?
Re: China
I agreed absolutely with StilesBC.
Credit IS - money.
It is clear that many US citizens can not (or will not) get - credit these days.
If you think that this automatically means - deflationary spiral... please think twice.
Could you perhaps considerate situations where "the State" taking credit steadily to pay all possible expenses:
- schools
- kindergartens
- reparations and constructions of railways and highways.
- medical care
- "development" projects
- car industry, airspace industry, energy industry, media industry......... (we can forget the "financial industry" for a moment)
- wage a couple of open wars...
- surveillance of other countries as well as own citizens... ("information war")
...
...
It is clear that these jobs are many... real many...
And all of these "activities" should be payed.
Of course with credit money - the State took - to "help economy"...
So it looks that, at least a couple of "trillions", are necessary in credit to keep all these "activity swimming..."
With other words - "the credit" will "flow" again even if ONLY as "State credit".
It is of course - a little problem...
Namely, in case that State CAN NOT get a credit from OTHER nations (States) - ...(and also - as logical results from all "activities" with borrowed money (credit) the State can NOT collect enough money from taxes!)
How, you think, that the State in question - will finance all those (and other) activities above...?
Credit IS - money.
It is clear that many US citizens can not (or will not) get - credit these days.
If you think that this automatically means - deflationary spiral... please think twice.
Could you perhaps considerate situations where "the State" taking credit steadily to pay all possible expenses:
- schools
- kindergartens
- reparations and constructions of railways and highways.
- medical care
- "development" projects
- car industry, airspace industry, energy industry, media industry......... (we can forget the "financial industry" for a moment)
- wage a couple of open wars...
- surveillance of other countries as well as own citizens... ("information war")
...
...
It is clear that these jobs are many... real many...
And all of these "activities" should be payed.
Of course with credit money - the State took - to "help economy"...
So it looks that, at least a couple of "trillions", are necessary in credit to keep all these "activity swimming..."
With other words - "the credit" will "flow" again even if ONLY as "State credit".
It is of course - a little problem...
Namely, in case that State CAN NOT get a credit from OTHER nations (States) - ...(and also - as logical results from all "activities" with borrowed money (credit) the State can NOT collect enough money from taxes!)
How, you think, that the State in question - will finance all those (and other) activities above...?
Re: China
John,
Thought you might find this article interesting:
http://www.marketskeptics.com/2009/02/d ... wheat.html
Does China's 60 million tons of wheat reserves actually exists?
by Eric deCarbonnel
It fits in with your China going down the tubes theory.
wtf
Thought you might find this article interesting:
http://www.marketskeptics.com/2009/02/d ... wheat.html
Does China's 60 million tons of wheat reserves actually exists?
by Eric deCarbonnel
It fits in with your China going down the tubes theory.
wtf
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