China

[John]

Earlier this year, we saw a very angry and paranoid Beijing
government reacting harshly to the Tibet demonstrations and to the
worldwide anti-China protests that preceded the Beijing Olympics.

** Chinese embarrassment and anger grows over Tibet and Olympics
** http://www.generationaldynamics.com/cgi-bin/D.PL?d=ww2010.i.china080412

Those protests ended, however, in the worldwide sympathy for the
Chinese people following the horrible in May, beginning a period of
international good will directed at China.

** Sichuan earthquake devastation opens a period of good will with China, in contrast to Burma
** http://www.generationaldynamics.com/cgi-bin/D.PL?xct=gd.e080516#e080516

Now the Tibetan situation is getting more serious again.

** Generational split among Tibetans increases chances of conflict with China.
** http://www.generationaldynamics.com/cgi-bin/D.PL?xct=gd.e081123#e081123

However, that's not China's main problem. China's main problem is
that its economy is deteriorating very rapidly, and the rate of
deterioration is accelerating.

** Rapid Chinese economic collapse spurs desperation measures
** http://www.generationaldynamics.com/cgi-bin/D.PL?xct=gd.e081128#e081128

China's rapid deterioration is significant for China, for America, and
for the entire world.

Sincerely,

John

John J. Xenakis
E-mail: john@GenerationalDynamics.com
Web site: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com
Forum: http://www.GenerationalDynamics.com/forum

[John]

-- China 'faces mass social unrest'

More desperation from China:

> China 'faces mass social unrest'

> Rising unemployment and the economic slowdown could cause massive
> social turmoil in China, a leading scholar in the Communist Party
> has said.

> "The redistribution of wealth through theft and robbery could
> dramatically increase and menaces to social stability will grow,"
> Zhou Tianyong, a researcher at the Central Party School in
> Beijing, wrote in the China Economic Times.

> "This is extremely likely to create a reactive situation of
> mass-scale social turmoil," he wrote.

> His views do not reflect leadership policy but highlight worries
> in elite circles about the impact of the economic slowdown.

> Mr Zhou warned that the real rate of urban joblessness reached
> 12% this year and could reach 14% next year as the economy slows.
> http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7766921.stm

John

[JimZ]

John has often mentioned reading "The Bubble that Broke the World" (I think that's the title), and has noted that this time around, China is playing the role of the US and the US is playing the role Germany played.

Beyond the scary prospect of Obama's next book being titled "Mein Kampf", here is some sobering comparisons from the UK Daily Telegraph:

"China has relied on exports to North America and Europe as its growth engine, making it acutely vulnerable to the contraction in global demand. Mr Pettis said this recalls the role played by the US in the 1920s, a parallel fraught with danger. "In the 1930s the US foolishly tried to dump capacity abroad, but the furious reaction of trading partners caused the strategy to misfire. China already seems to be in the process of engineering its own Smoot-Hawley," he said, referring to the infamous US Tariff Act in 1930. "

Here is the link: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/econ ... alues.html

[nanook]

John,

If we are to count the Cambodian Killing Field as the most recent sufficiently significant "Crisis War" experience that Thais had, the last "Crisis War" in China did not end in 1949. The Mao nightmare didn't end until the late 1960's and early 70's, with the result that anyone 35 or older today in China having witnessed first hand the political and economic turmoil that killed millions of people. The blog postings from the Chinese "internet generation" may well be grossly over-representing 20yr-old college kids, the post-Tiananmen brainwashed generation. They are not the ones in charge, either politically speaking or demographically speaking. The ones in senior and middle management are generations now aged between 35-70 (China having a habit of putting old men in charge at the top, hence to 70 instead of the typical 60 top side cut-off in most other countries). Most of them had witnessed the Mao nightmare first-hand; those who didn't also had a good inkling of it during the brief period of liberalization in the 80's before Tiananmen. IIRC, the students at Tiananmen 1989 actually built a statue modelled after the Statue of Liberty; some even openly advocated the need for China to be colonized by the west. Those were very pro-western generations. The CCP launched the ultra-nationalist brainwashing program in public schools after Tiananmen. The "angry youth" that came out of the brainwash program, the same crowd responsible for the ridiculous posts that we see online, are very much the butt of jokes among even most Chinese who are older than 35.

When Chinese economy falls apart, which I agree it probably will, with all the Keynesian capital misallocations coming, the CCP will lose its last vestige of legitimacy. It won't be able to challenge any of its neighbors militarily, simply because itself is too corrupt and inefficient. I agree with you that, some military officer probably will kick out CCP as there is no grassroot organized opposition; then regional commanders and governors will declare their own independence . . . in a way that's very much similar to the 1911 Sun Yatsen revolution against the exhausted Manchu Dynasty. . . more or less bloodless . . . simply because the generations in charge had already lived through bloody nightmares in their youths. There were plenty incidents that could have triggered massive bloody civil war in the 1910's China, including dynastic restoration and subsequent repudiation, twice over, but no large scale war took place (very much in keeping with your Generational Dynamics theory). China simply transformed into regional rule. Large scale Chinese civil war did not come about until a decade plus later, when warlords wanted to fight over the right to borrow sovereign debt in the name of all of China; otherwise, there would have been little incentive for them to fight for the empty title of the central government; in terms of generational dynamics, by the 1930's, it was a full saeculum after the two-decade long Taiping nightmare which ended in the 1860's. The fighting (instead of co-existing) warlordism and Maoist nightmare lasted about three decades, from the 30's to the end of the 60's, with Japan making a cameo appearance for 8 of those years. More people died under Mao's misgovernment after 1949 than under either the Japanese occupation or the peak of the Chinese civil war in the late 1940's. That's a sanguine piece of knowledge that Chinese older than 30 either know first-hand, or have learned during the 1980's brief liberal period from the survivors (their own parents and grandparents).

Hopefully, CCP loses power and China splinters into regional rule soon, so the brainwashed generation can learn the real history instead of the xenophobic nonsense that the CCP has been feeding the kids since Tiananmen, before their generation steps into the generational leadership role, in another 20-30yrs or so.

[The Grey Badger]

Yes, and as n observation - probably a completely banal one - I've noticed that the most conservative governments in the world, whether of a nation or of an institution, are those geared towards filling their highest offices with very old men. China, the Vatican, the Latter Day Saints - I'm sure many others will come to mind. The question with China is, will this trend continue no matter what? Or will the changing times end with getting rid of their tendency to gerontocracy? I think this is probably one of the most important questions facing China in the long run.

[nanook]

TGB,

IMHO, leadership shifts to the younger generations as a Crisis War progresses, simply because the physical attrition during such a war. Crisis Wars for continent-sized enties seem to last a long time. e.g. French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars engulfing all of Europe lasted 26 years, during the first decade of which the leadership became progressively younger as the older generation were either physically wiped out or sidelined due to exhaustion. That may also explain why the Crisis Wars on continental scale last so long: at the end of the first decade, young men like Napoleon came into power, and they could stay in power for quite a long time, keep fighting the Crisis War for another decade and half.

[John]

> If we are to count the Cambodian Killing Field as the most recent
> sufficiently significant "Crisis War" experience that Thais had,
> the last "Crisis War" in China did not end in 1949. The Mao
> nightmare didn't end until the late 1960's and early 70's, with
> the result that anyone 35 or older today in China having witnessed
> first hand the political and economic turmoil that killed millions
> of people.

From the point of view of Generational Dynamics, the Communist
Revolution civil war clearly climaxed in 1949. Then began the
Recovery era, where both the Communists and the Nationalists
consolidated their power bases. It's not unusual for a war to occur
during a Recovery Era; for example, America fought the Korean War
during the 1950s. But Recovery Era wars are never crisis wars, or
even close to it. As horrendous as Mao's Great Leap Forward was,
causing the death by starvation and execution of tens of millions of
people, in no way does it resemble a crisis war.

> When Chinese economy falls apart, which I agree it probably will,
> with all the Keynesian capital misallocations coming, the CCP will
> lose its last vestige of legitimacy. It won't be able to challenge
> any of its neighbors militarily, simply because itself is too
> corrupt and inefficient.

I wish I could believe this. One way or another, those 2.5 billion
people are going to be at war -- with themselves, with the Japanese,
with the Americans.

> I agree with you that, some military officer probably will kick
> out CCP as there is no grassroot organized opposition; then
> regional commanders and governors will declare their own
> independence . . . in a way that's very much similar to the 1911
> Sun Yatsen revolution against the exhausted Manchu Dynasty. . .
> more or less bloodless . . . simply because the generations in
> charge had already lived through bloody nightmares in their
> youths. There were plenty incidents that could have triggered
> massive bloody civil war in the 1910's China, including dynastic
> restoration and subsequent repudiation, twice over, but no large
> scale war took place (very much in keeping with your Generational
> Dynamics theory). China simply transformed into regional rule.

You have to be careful here. The Chinese Revolution of 1911 was an
Awakening era climax -- much like the resignation of Richard Nixon or
the end of the Second Reich in Germany after WW I.

Sincerely,

John

[John]

Dear Pat,

> Yes, and as n observation - probably a completely banal one -
> I've noticed that the most conservative governments in the world,
> whether of a nation or of an institution, are those geared towards
> filling their highest offices with very old men. China, the
> Vatican, the Latter Day Saints - I'm sure many others will come to
> mind. The question with China is, will this trend continue no
> matter what? Or will the changing times end with getting rid of
> their tendency to gerontocracy? I think this is probably one of
> the most important questions facing China in the long
> run.

What exactly is a "conservative government"? I suspect that you're
referring to any crisis era government.

Sincerely,

John

[John]

Dear Jim,

> John has often mentioned reading "The Bubble that Broke the World"
> (I think that's the title), and has noted that this time around,
> China is playing the role of the US and the US is playing the role
> Germany played.

> Beyond the scary prospect of Obama's next book being titled "Mein
> Kampf", here is some sobering comparisons from the UK Daily
> Telegraph:

> "China has relied on exports to North America and Europe as its
> growth engine, making it acutely vulnerable to the contraction in
> global demand. Mr Pettis said this recalls the role played by the
> US in the 1920s, a parallel fraught with danger. "In the 1930s the
> US foolishly tried to dump capacity abroad, but the furious
> reaction of trading partners caused the strategy to misfire. China
> already seems to be in the process of engineering its own
> Smoot-Hawley," he said, referring to the infamous US Tariff Act in
> 1930. "

> Here is the link:
> http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/econ ... alues.html

I've had several web site readers write to me about this article,
comparing China's recent bailout measures to the Smoot-Hawley act.

There really isn't too much similarity between the two measures,
although as you suggest, both may be protectionist. The Smoot-Hawley
law was designed to block imports, supposedly protecting jobs.
China's measures are designed to increase domestic spending, which is
a different thing. It doesn't really matter, since neither of these
measures could ever succeed.

** Rapid Chinese economic collapse spurs desperation measures
** http://www.generationaldynamics.com/cgi-bin/D.PL?xct=gd.e081128#e081128

Sincerely,

John

[The Grey Badger]

Ok - your quote function was hanging up, so I'm answering here. By "Conservative" I don't mean on the left-right axis, but given to keeping things as they were, being extremely slow to change. Since the last Crisis Era vivid in my memory at second hand was the last one, which I heard about at great length form my parents and their contemporaries, I don't see how that could be called Conservative in either definition; Roosevelt was considered quite radical and certainly given to change at the time, right or wrong. Ditto Lincoln.

Now, by those standards, the Chinese government cannot - now - be called Conservative; they've undergone two huge changes in my lifetime. But as soon as Mao's changes were made, they were locked in hard for quite some time. And certainly both the Vatican and Salt Lake City move with the speed of a glacier, and that is on purpose. Especially the Vatican. China used to be notorious for it, and as I said, once Mao's 'reforms' were locked in solid, the pundits (who may of all been talking through their hats) pointed to how long the Long March Generation held the reins of power and laid it at the door of China's gerontocratic tradition.

I have also seen the same thing in the private sector, on evey level from small-town clubs to long-established corporations. Not that all change is for the good!

Correct me if I'm wrong.