11-Apr-16 World View -- Armenia-Azerbaijan ceasefire holds, despite hundreds of 'breaches'
'Horrific' scenes as Macedonian police lob teargas into Idomeni refugee camp
** 11-Apr-16 World View -- Armenia-Azerbaijan ceasefire holds, despite hundreds of 'breaches'
** http://www.generationaldynamics.com/pg/ ... tm#e160411
Contents:
'Horrific' scenes as Macedonian police lob teargas into Idomeni refugee camp
Armenia-Azerbaijan ceasefire holds, despite hundreds of 'breaches'
Keys:
Generational Dynamics, Greece, Idomeni camp, Macedonia,
Piraeus, Turkey,
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh, NKB, Russia,
Dmitry Medvedev, Vladimir Putin
11-Apr-16 World View -- Armenia-Azerbaijan ceasefire holds, despite hundreds of 'breaches'
Re: 11-Apr-16 World View -- Armenia-Azerbaijan ceasefire holds, despite hundreds of 'breaches'
A web site reader has raised questions relevant to the following
article, which is behind a paywall and can sometimes be accessed for
free and sometimes not.
https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/armen ... -laid-bare
Armenia's Isolation Laid Bare
Analysis
April 10, 2016 | 13:00 GMT Print
Text Size
A view of Mount Ararat in Turkey from the Armenian capital city of
Yerevan. (EUGENE CHAUSOVSKY/Stratfor)
Analysis
By Eugene Chausovsky
The tension in Yerevan was palpable. Overnight April 1, just a few
days before I arrived in the city, fighting had broken out in the
disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, home to a quasi-independent
statelet backed by Armenia known as the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. The
line of contact where Karabakh fighters clashed with Azerbaijani
soldiers was around 300 kilometers (186 miles) away, but in Yerevan it
felt much closer. I found myself in the city amid the breakdown of a
cease-fire that had largely held since 1994.
The Representative Office of Nagorno-Karabakh in Yerevan. (EUGENE
CHAUSOVSKY/Stratfor)
Walking the streets, I caught snatches of nervous conversation – again
and again I heard people mention "Azerbaijan" and "Artsakh," the
Armenian name for Nagorno-Karabakh. The emotional attachment on the
part of the capital city's residents to the small breakaway republic
was clearly strong. Large groups of men huddled around taxis and on
street corners to listen intently to news of the conflict being played
on the radio. Taxi drivers could speak of nothing else. Everyone
seemed to have at least one relative or friend living in
Nagorno-Karabakh.
The fighting proved to be short-lived, and within three days a
cease-fire was back in place. Just like that, the conflict gave way to
the uneasy peace that has predominated for over two decades. Or had
it? The question still remained: Why did the conflict break out in the
first place? It may have been just another historical blip, or it
could presage a larger conflict to come, perhaps one involving
regional heavyweights Turkey and Russia, or even Western powers. And
what was the role of those powers in the current fighting?
I discussed these questions with anyone I could — government
officials, political analysts, journalists and ordinary people. Their
opinions varied in the details, but they generally agreed on three
things. Most of them blamed Azerbaijan for initiating the fighting
because the status quo is favorable to Armenia but detrimental to
Baku's interests. Many also believed (correctly) at the outset of the
conflict that the fighting was unlikely to spark a larger war. They
noted, with anxiety, that Armenia stands alone in Nagorno-Karabakh,
with no one to turn to for help.
A view of Republic Square in central Yerevan. (EUGENE
CHAUSOVSKY/Stratfor)
These are all, of course, simply opinions. Moreover, they are informed
by fear and national bias. But they do provide some insight into the
mindset of the Armenian people. The last of them, Armenia's isolation,
is particularly noteworthy because it has grounding in Armenia's
current geopolitical position. The nation is located in the unstable
Caucasus region, along with Georgia, Azerbaijan and the volatile
Russian republics of Chechnya and Dagestan. The region is surrounded
by Russia, Turkey and Iran – three massive powers with diverging
interests. Tiny Armenia clearly occupies a tough position and, because
of it, must navigate a complex web of relationships. Yerevan is
hostile toward Azerbaijan because of Nagorno-Karabakh, and it also has
a tense relationship and closed border with Turkey, which supports
Azerbaijan. Georgia also cooperates closely with Azerbaijan and Turkey
on energy and security matters. Iran is not a major geopolitical
player in the Caucasus, at least for now.
To survive in such a volatile environment, Armenia has chosen to
strategically align itself with Russia since the fall of the Soviet
Union, joining both the Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective
Security Treaty Organization. Armenia hosts nearly 5,000 Russian
troops in the 102nd military base in Gyumri, and Russia is responsible
for guarding Armenia's border with Turkey. Russia owns much of
Armenia's strategic infrastructure, including energy pipelines and
telecommunications firms, and the country's economy is closely tied to
that of Russia.
But this loyalty is not always reciprocal. Whereas friendship with
Russia is a top priority for Armenia, the relationship is not the only
interest for Moscow, and Russia needs to weigh it against other
strategic considerations. Its response to the recent outbreak of
conflict demonstrated this. Rather than backing Armenia militarily or
politically in the hostilities, Russian officials instead called for
calm. Armenians were quick to point out that Russia is a major
supplier of weapons to Azerbaijan, some of which were used by Baku in
the recent escalation. Moscow has taken an evenhanded political
approach with Yerevan and Baku, and Russian Prime Minister Dmitri
Medvedev visited both capitals in succession on April 7 and April 8.
Russia's balanced response may seem odd given Armenia's loyalty and
Azerbaijan's often confrontational attitude toward Moscow. Baku's
strategic partnership with Ankara makes it seem even stranger. Most
Armenians I spoke to, however, put forward theories about Russia's
response (or lack thereof). Some thought Moscow wanted hostilities to
escalate in Nagorno-Karabakh so that it could intervene later and
extend its influence over both Armenia and Azerbaijan. They believed
Russia's military presence in Armenia was less a security guarantee in
the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh than a check on the power of Turkey
and the West. Others saw Russia in a more positive light but admitted
that Moscow's larger struggles with Turkey over Syria and with the
West over Ukraine manifest in the Caucasus and exacerbate conflicts,
sometimes to the detriment of Armenia.
The latest conflict is just another reminder of Armenia's unenviable
geopolitical position. Its valuable alliance with Russia has not
helped in the last few days amid a flare-up in greatest threat to
Armenian security. But Yerevan has no one else to turn to: Turkey is
allied with Azerbaijan, and the West is not willing to risk a
confrontation with Russia, as shown by its inaction in Georgia.
Armenia's commercial and political ties with Iran might later prove
valuable, but at the moment Tehran is in no position to play a
meaningful role in the Caucasus or to challenge Russia in any
capacity. Someday, though, that could change.
For now, Armenia must to a great extent fend for itself in
Nagorno-Karabakh. Unless the simmering tension boils over into a
full-blown conflict on par with the war of 1988-1994, the attitudes of
Russia and other regional players will likely remain the same. The
next steps are unclear, but the truce is shaky at best, meaning
violence may flare up in the region. When it does, Yerevan will find
itself unsettled and anxious once again, with little help from its
allies.
article, which is behind a paywall and can sometimes be accessed for
free and sometimes not.
https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/armen ... -laid-bare
Armenia's Isolation Laid Bare
Analysis
April 10, 2016 | 13:00 GMT Print
Text Size
A view of Mount Ararat in Turkey from the Armenian capital city of
Yerevan. (EUGENE CHAUSOVSKY/Stratfor)
Analysis
By Eugene Chausovsky
The tension in Yerevan was palpable. Overnight April 1, just a few
days before I arrived in the city, fighting had broken out in the
disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, home to a quasi-independent
statelet backed by Armenia known as the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. The
line of contact where Karabakh fighters clashed with Azerbaijani
soldiers was around 300 kilometers (186 miles) away, but in Yerevan it
felt much closer. I found myself in the city amid the breakdown of a
cease-fire that had largely held since 1994.
The Representative Office of Nagorno-Karabakh in Yerevan. (EUGENE
CHAUSOVSKY/Stratfor)
Walking the streets, I caught snatches of nervous conversation – again
and again I heard people mention "Azerbaijan" and "Artsakh," the
Armenian name for Nagorno-Karabakh. The emotional attachment on the
part of the capital city's residents to the small breakaway republic
was clearly strong. Large groups of men huddled around taxis and on
street corners to listen intently to news of the conflict being played
on the radio. Taxi drivers could speak of nothing else. Everyone
seemed to have at least one relative or friend living in
Nagorno-Karabakh.
The fighting proved to be short-lived, and within three days a
cease-fire was back in place. Just like that, the conflict gave way to
the uneasy peace that has predominated for over two decades. Or had
it? The question still remained: Why did the conflict break out in the
first place? It may have been just another historical blip, or it
could presage a larger conflict to come, perhaps one involving
regional heavyweights Turkey and Russia, or even Western powers. And
what was the role of those powers in the current fighting?
I discussed these questions with anyone I could — government
officials, political analysts, journalists and ordinary people. Their
opinions varied in the details, but they generally agreed on three
things. Most of them blamed Azerbaijan for initiating the fighting
because the status quo is favorable to Armenia but detrimental to
Baku's interests. Many also believed (correctly) at the outset of the
conflict that the fighting was unlikely to spark a larger war. They
noted, with anxiety, that Armenia stands alone in Nagorno-Karabakh,
with no one to turn to for help.
A view of Republic Square in central Yerevan. (EUGENE
CHAUSOVSKY/Stratfor)
These are all, of course, simply opinions. Moreover, they are informed
by fear and national bias. But they do provide some insight into the
mindset of the Armenian people. The last of them, Armenia's isolation,
is particularly noteworthy because it has grounding in Armenia's
current geopolitical position. The nation is located in the unstable
Caucasus region, along with Georgia, Azerbaijan and the volatile
Russian republics of Chechnya and Dagestan. The region is surrounded
by Russia, Turkey and Iran – three massive powers with diverging
interests. Tiny Armenia clearly occupies a tough position and, because
of it, must navigate a complex web of relationships. Yerevan is
hostile toward Azerbaijan because of Nagorno-Karabakh, and it also has
a tense relationship and closed border with Turkey, which supports
Azerbaijan. Georgia also cooperates closely with Azerbaijan and Turkey
on energy and security matters. Iran is not a major geopolitical
player in the Caucasus, at least for now.
To survive in such a volatile environment, Armenia has chosen to
strategically align itself with Russia since the fall of the Soviet
Union, joining both the Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective
Security Treaty Organization. Armenia hosts nearly 5,000 Russian
troops in the 102nd military base in Gyumri, and Russia is responsible
for guarding Armenia's border with Turkey. Russia owns much of
Armenia's strategic infrastructure, including energy pipelines and
telecommunications firms, and the country's economy is closely tied to
that of Russia.
But this loyalty is not always reciprocal. Whereas friendship with
Russia is a top priority for Armenia, the relationship is not the only
interest for Moscow, and Russia needs to weigh it against other
strategic considerations. Its response to the recent outbreak of
conflict demonstrated this. Rather than backing Armenia militarily or
politically in the hostilities, Russian officials instead called for
calm. Armenians were quick to point out that Russia is a major
supplier of weapons to Azerbaijan, some of which were used by Baku in
the recent escalation. Moscow has taken an evenhanded political
approach with Yerevan and Baku, and Russian Prime Minister Dmitri
Medvedev visited both capitals in succession on April 7 and April 8.
Russia's balanced response may seem odd given Armenia's loyalty and
Azerbaijan's often confrontational attitude toward Moscow. Baku's
strategic partnership with Ankara makes it seem even stranger. Most
Armenians I spoke to, however, put forward theories about Russia's
response (or lack thereof). Some thought Moscow wanted hostilities to
escalate in Nagorno-Karabakh so that it could intervene later and
extend its influence over both Armenia and Azerbaijan. They believed
Russia's military presence in Armenia was less a security guarantee in
the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh than a check on the power of Turkey
and the West. Others saw Russia in a more positive light but admitted
that Moscow's larger struggles with Turkey over Syria and with the
West over Ukraine manifest in the Caucasus and exacerbate conflicts,
sometimes to the detriment of Armenia.
The latest conflict is just another reminder of Armenia's unenviable
geopolitical position. Its valuable alliance with Russia has not
helped in the last few days amid a flare-up in greatest threat to
Armenian security. But Yerevan has no one else to turn to: Turkey is
allied with Azerbaijan, and the West is not willing to risk a
confrontation with Russia, as shown by its inaction in Georgia.
Armenia's commercial and political ties with Iran might later prove
valuable, but at the moment Tehran is in no position to play a
meaningful role in the Caucasus or to challenge Russia in any
capacity. Someday, though, that could change.
For now, Armenia must to a great extent fend for itself in
Nagorno-Karabakh. Unless the simmering tension boils over into a
full-blown conflict on par with the war of 1988-1994, the attitudes of
Russia and other regional players will likely remain the same. The
next steps are unclear, but the truce is shaky at best, meaning
violence may flare up in the region. When it does, Yerevan will find
itself unsettled and anxious once again, with little help from its
allies.
Re: 11-Apr-16 World View -- Armenia-Azerbaijan ceasefire holds, despite hundreds of 'breaches'
When things get nasty---
Does art imitate life?- or- Does life inmate art? -
"A wrenching scene of shipwrecked men helpless in the grips of the ocean, Théodore Géricault's The Raft of the Medusa is heralded as one of the most influential works of French Romanticism. But the story behind this 1819 painting is far richer and more tragic than you might imagine."
http://mentalfloss.com/article/66839/15 ... aft-medusa
Nature has no favorites.
Does art imitate life?- or- Does life inmate art? -
"A wrenching scene of shipwrecked men helpless in the grips of the ocean, Théodore Géricault's The Raft of the Medusa is heralded as one of the most influential works of French Romanticism. But the story behind this 1819 painting is far richer and more tragic than you might imagine."
http://mentalfloss.com/article/66839/15 ... aft-medusa
Nature has no favorites.
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