Generational Dynamics Forum - New Site

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ankara

Amurru and the Land of the Amorites. The ancient texts found in this city date from 18B.C. and are written in the Akkadian-language, and refer to the Amorites by the name of the warlike tribe, 'Banuyamina.' The meaning of the compound Hebrew name, Banu- Yamina is another form of the English name, Benjamin.

But when he came to it, he found only leaves, because it was not the right time for figs.

As was told to me "seen" the mid war is upon.

As before https://www.revolvy.com/topic/Trial%20o ... type=topic

I am saddened H that Sabbateans of effects is back as I feared. Few will understand the effect and more will
will be deceived not understanding the gravity of it.

I have been intent on affairs lately of effects that you have clearly covered. A facet of the generational dynamics is the teeth are sharper
closer to the nose of the beast and the hurt of those that covet.

But we are told = Blessed are those who mourn, for they will be comforted. Blessed are the meek, for they will inherit the earth.
Blessed are those who hunger and thirst for righteousness, for they will be filled.…

It goes much deeper as we unwind some sunk cost analysis going forward in the supply chains also.

context: [The emergence of an omnipotent managerial class] was, on the contrary, an outgrowth of the interventionist policies consciously aiming at an elimination of the influence of the shareholders and at their virtual expropriation.
Ludwig von Mises 1949

Democrat AGs From 18 States Sue To Keep ACA Subsidies.

So how do you maintain Capital when they already spend more than they can be accountable for?
Alternatively, we seek to explain the differences between corporate governance structures by looking at the causal relationships between property rights, incentives, and government regulation, and by redefining the nature of government intervention.
This point is illustrated perfectly by their observation that corporations in civil-law countries are typically controlled by the State (such as in France), while corporations in common-law countries have been under dispersed ownership. Their comment about State-controlled corporations is without appeal; such corporations are “extremely inefficient” and expropriate minority shareholders. Moreover, they show that such countries are also marked by more corruption because of the strong bond with the political sphere (Shleifer and Vishny 1997, pp. 767–69).
A theory that explains duty doctrine will also explain strict liability doctrine.
http://gdxforum.com/forum/search.php?ke ... sf=msgonly

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2014-02-1 ... stribution

yen and eud spillover buying tangible assets here will peak soon enough. Reserve banks strip mining savers with internal recycling. Nominal savings wiped out with financial repression intent and
moving to next geo political monetary debasement phase as globals condense with what we seen coming.

In the view of Rosen (1997), p. 147 (emphasis added):
…having observed choices in different price and income configurations, we can invert the process and infer what those underlying preferences must have been, as long as preferences are reasonably stable and the source of variation is sufficient to achieve identification.
Many Austrians hold to the view that quantitative empirical work in economics is infeasible or uninteresting because the world is changing so much that “behavioral relationships” inherently are unstable and it is fruitless to estimate them. An unwillingness to pursue the consequences of “given conditions” greatly limits the empirical scope and consequences of Austrian economic theory. The paucity of quantitative empirical work in the Austrian tradition accounts for why so few Austrians are found in the professional economics community today.
For support of Rosen, see Laband and Tollison (2000); also see rejoinders to Rosen by Anderson (2000), Block (2000), Thornton (2004); Yeager (1997, 2000).

Separate thread: Tuberculosis out break locally.

In answer to the question: Do you have anyone dependent on you replied:
2.1 million illegal immigrants,
1.1 million crack-heads
4.4 million unemployable scroungers
900,000 criminals in 85 prisons
650 idiots in Parliament and the whole of the European Commission

His response was deemed unacceptable.

In response, he asked "Who did I miss out?"

This point is illustrated perfectly by their observation that corporations in civil-law countries are typically controlled by the State (such as in France), while corporations in common-law countries have been under dispersed ownership. Their comment about State-controlled corporations is without appeal; such corporations are “extremely inefficient” and expropriate minority shareholders. Moreover, they show that such countries are also marked by more corruption because of the strong bond with the political sphere (Shleifer and Vishny 1997, pp. 767–69).
Finally, such studies show that in civil-law countries, insider trading scandals usually have a connection to political power. The Triangle Industries scandal is one illustration. The scandal involved insider purchases of Triangle shares shortly before Pechiney bought it in 1989. Among the six French buyers who were indicted for insider trading, one (Roger-Patrice Pelat) was a close, longtime friend of the president of the Republic. Two others (Max Théret and Harris Puisais) were also close to political power. If you follow the individuals back to origen a trend is apparent.
Many argue "Austrians" that managerial omnipotence can be explained as the result of government regulations reducing shareholder-owners' incentives to efficiently manage their property, namely, their stock in the corporation.
Ruthless mindset's can be followed to conclusion as to avert the loss of investment capital and I always convey know it better than your wife since Most older mindset managers convey labor and Capital as a marrage. My preference is based on fact and a line of reason as both party's have only social responsibility's only called contract.

Notes from also: Marks, Stephen G. 1999. "The Separation of Ownership and Control." In Boudewijn Bouckaert and Gerrit De Geest (eds.). Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. Pp. 692-710

"Your statement of the "Fed is unable to target all aspects of the economy equally" is basically saying that the economy has so many pieces that it is hard for the Fed to control all pieces. That is what I meant by this being a hard "control-system" problem."

[The emergence of an omnipotent managerial class] was, on the contrary, an outgrowth of the interventionist policies consciously aiming at an elimination of the influence of the shareholders and at their virtual expropriation.
Ludwig von Mises 1949

People overall I feel do not get it yet. To be able to delay immediate satisfaction for the sake of future consequences has long been considered an essential achievement of human development.
Contrary to the United States, where regulations were originally developed to protect the shareholders from expropriating managers and induce the latter to best serve shareholders' interests through profit-maximization, in European countries where some kind of "anti-capitalistic mentality" prevails, regulations did not seek to induce managers to promote profit-maximization; rather, they sought to protect workers to maintain social stability.
So how do you maintain Capital when they already spend more than they can be acountable for?
Alternatively, we seek to explain the differences between corporate governance structures by looking at the causal relationships between property rights, incentives, and government regulation, and by redefining the nature of government intervention.
This point is illustrated perfectly by their observation that corporations in civil-law countries are typically controlled by the State (such as in France), while corporations in common-law countries have been under dispersed ownership. Their comment about State-controlled corporations is without appeal; such corporations are “extremely inefficient” and expropriate minority shareholders. Moreover, they show that such countries are also marked by more corruption because of the strong bond with the political sphere (Shleifer and Vishny 1997, pp. 767–69).
Finally, such studies show that in civil-law countries, insider trading scandals usually have a connection to political power. The Triangle Industries scandal is one illustration. The scandal involved insider purchases of Triangle shares shortly before Pechiney bought it in 1989. Among the six French buyers who were indicted for insider trading, one (Roger-Patrice Pelat) was a close, longtime friend of the president of the Republic. Two others (Max Théret and Harris Puisais) were also close to political power. If you follow the individuals back to origen a trend is apparent.
Many argue "Austrians" that managerial omnipotence can be explained as the result of government regulations reducing shareholder-owners' incentives to efficiently manage their property, namely, their stock in the corporation.
Ruthless mindset's can be followed to conclusion as to avert the loss of investment capital and I always convey know it better than your wife since Most older mindset managers convey labor and Capital as a marrage. My preference is based on fact and a line of reason as both party's have only social responsibility's only called contract.

Notes from also: Marks, Stephen G. 1999. "The Separation of Ownership and Control." In Boudewijn Bouckaert and Gerrit De Geest (eds.). Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. Pp. 692-710