by Guest » Wed Sep 27, 2017 1:55 pm
The Kurdish Peshmerga has evidently been building towards this referendum for years. First, the Peshmerga has generally blocked Arabs from returning to cities and areas that it liberates from ISIS. This means that these Arabs did not vote in the referendum. Second, for the past wile the Peshmerga has refrained from taking control of any new territory. For example in Kairawan, Tel Afar, and Hawijah areas, the Peshmerga has held its lines but not advanced. This means that the residents of these predominantly Arab regions also did not vote in the referendum.
Given all this preparation, it was a virtual certainty that the referendum would overwhelmingly favour independence. I also find it unlikely that the Kurdish Regional Government will abandon its path of several years and goal of several decades by not declaring independence at this time. I therefore conclude with high confidence that the KRG will soon declare independence from Iraq.
What will be the result of this declaration? It seams to me that Iraqi Kurdistan is already de facto independent. Baghdad has not exercised effective control over the Kurdish region since 2011. One effect of the declaration of independence will be to infuriate the Iraqi government, which would rather rule Kurdistan itself. Another effect will be to infuriate the Turkish government, whose leaders oppose Kurdistan and everything Kurdish. Already, because of the referendum, the Iraqi and Turkish militaries are conducting joint military drills in southern Turkey. This is not only unprecedented but very odd, given that the one is Shiite Arab and the other is Sunni Turkish.
The Iraqi and Turkish militaries certainly could defeat the Peshmergas and conqueror Iraqi Kurdistan, given that it is landlocked and without it's own air-force. However it is unlikely that the political will exists for a war of that magnitude at this time. The most that Iraq and Turkey are likely to do is impose embargoes or sanctions on the de facto independent state. It is also unlikely that any established state, except possibly Israel, will officially recognize Iraqi Kurdistan as an independent state or establish diplomatic relations.
The Kurdish Peshmerga has evidently been building towards this referendum for years. First, the Peshmerga has generally blocked Arabs from returning to cities and areas that it liberates from ISIS. This means that these Arabs did not vote in the referendum. Second, for the past wile the Peshmerga has refrained from taking control of any new territory. For example in Kairawan, Tel Afar, and Hawijah areas, the Peshmerga has held its lines but not advanced. This means that the residents of these predominantly Arab regions also did not vote in the referendum.
Given all this preparation, it was a virtual certainty that the referendum would overwhelmingly favour independence. I also find it unlikely that the Kurdish Regional Government will abandon its path of several years and goal of several decades by not declaring independence at this time. I therefore conclude with high confidence that the KRG will soon declare independence from Iraq.
What will be the result of this declaration? It seams to me that Iraqi Kurdistan is already [i]de facto[/i] independent. Baghdad has not exercised effective control over the Kurdish region since 2011. One effect of the declaration of independence will be to infuriate the Iraqi government, which would rather rule Kurdistan itself. Another effect will be to infuriate the Turkish government, whose leaders oppose Kurdistan and everything Kurdish. Already, because of the referendum, the Iraqi and Turkish militaries are conducting joint military drills in southern Turkey. This is not only unprecedented but very odd, given that the one is Shiite Arab and the other is Sunni Turkish.
The Iraqi and Turkish militaries certainly could defeat the Peshmergas and conqueror Iraqi Kurdistan, given that it is landlocked and without it's own air-force. However it is unlikely that the political will exists for a war of that magnitude at this time. The most that Iraq and Turkey are likely to do is impose embargoes or sanctions on the [i]de facto[/i] independent state. It is also unlikely that any established state, except possibly Israel, will officially recognize Iraqi Kurdistan as an independent state or establish diplomatic relations.