by Trevor » Sun Mar 20, 2022 1:26 am
Nuclear war has often been treated as: "We push a button, everyone dies", with little changing from 1945-2020, save for the number of warheads, but this isn't even remotely true.
In the early days, nuclear weapons were treated as just another weapon of war, back when atomic bombs were still relatively small. When the Soviet Union developed an atomic and later hydrogen bomb, our thinking was forced to shift.
In the 1950s, we operated under the assumption of: "Bigger is better." We raced to develop as many massive multi-megaton monsters as we possibly could. At the time, bombing accuracy was abysmal and many bombers would likely be shot down before reaching any viable targets. During the Second World War, the necessary of escorts was clear from the beginning, although it took until late 1943 for some in the Air Force to accept this.
The Soviet Union lacked friendly bases in Europe and could not bomb us in the same way we could bomb them. The bomber gap and missile gap were untrue, but it was also something they wanted us to believe: that they were stronger than they were. Lacking friendly air fields and warm-water ports that couldn't be used as a chokepoint, the USSR went for ICBMs.
By the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis, it was apparent nuclear weapons couldn't be used in the same fashion as conventional ones. ICBMs of the time, especially Soviet ones, were inaccurate and unreliable. Hitting hardened targets was impossible and many missiles would fail to work; this problem was even worse for SLBMS.
Our strategy changed from "Massive retaliation" to "Flexible Response", focusing more on destroying military targets than cities, chief among them the nuclear forces of the other superpower. Bombers were slower but considered more accurate and flexible. Submarines were horribly inaccurate, but in theory, undetectable by either side. In reality, both sides hunted down the other's submarines, conventional and nuclear.
By the 1970s, ICBMs had grown accurate enough to hit hardened targets and the introduction of MIRVs meant most larger bombs were retired. They were too big to be practical weapons and you could cause far more devastation with several small bombs than one big one. Soviet warheads tended to be larger than their American counterparts, relying far more on ICBMs. Out of 11,000 strategic weapons we possessed at the end of the decade, only around 2,200 were based in missile silos. Contrast this to the Soviets having 5,000 out of 7,000 on their ICBMs.
Air defenses had advanced to the point where the majority were unlikely to make it through, on either side. To mitigate this, we developed long-range missiles that had a range of over 1,000 miles, allowing more survivability against enemy defenses. Even now, accuracy was such that hardened targets would need multiple warheads to destroy, hence the term: "overkill". If one warhead had only a 50% chance to destroy a target, you'd deploy 3-4.
At the end of the decade, the Soviet Union deployed the SS-20, an intermediate range, MIRV capable, ballistic missile. Some feared this could destroy every air field and communications center in Europe with minimal warning, leaving them helpless against Soviet aggression.
In response, we deployed the Pershing II and the Ground Launched Cruise Missile. Far more accurate than their predecessors, these could destroy every missile silo west of Moscow. Combined with the Tomahawk deployed in naval vessels, this switched the balance of power to the United States.
The rationale of possessing an enormous stockpile is that, in real life conditions, only a fraction of those weapons would actually be used against something. Many would be destroyed on the ground, or in port, and at least some missiles would fail. Even a near-miss against a missile silo might disable the missile, even if it's not destroyed. 3-4 warheads against an air field would destroy 200 warheads, as would sinking a submarine, on the open ocean or in port. The USSR's submarines were more detectable than NATOs, so you start running out of warheads pretty fast, as the situation chances from moment to moment.
As things stand now, even our SLBMs are accurate enough for a devastating first strike with a 100 kiloton warhead. Both the U.S. and Russia have around 1,600 operational warheads, with more targets than the number of missiles that would actually get through. China has at least several hundred of their own.
Our missile defense system is still limited but rapidly advancing. THAAD has around 332 interceptors and the AEGIS system possesses several hundred more. While they can't shoot down everything, thanks to decoys and malfunction, the attacking party would run into the same issues.
Nuclear war has often been treated as: "We push a button, everyone dies", with little changing from 1945-2020, save for the number of warheads, but this isn't even remotely true.
In the early days, nuclear weapons were treated as just another weapon of war, back when atomic bombs were still relatively small. When the Soviet Union developed an atomic and later hydrogen bomb, our thinking was forced to shift.
In the 1950s, we operated under the assumption of: "Bigger is better." We raced to develop as many massive multi-megaton monsters as we possibly could. At the time, bombing accuracy was abysmal and many bombers would likely be shot down before reaching any viable targets. During the Second World War, the necessary of escorts was clear from the beginning, although it took until late 1943 for some in the Air Force to accept this.
The Soviet Union lacked friendly bases in Europe and could not bomb us in the same way we could bomb them. The bomber gap and missile gap were untrue, but it was also something they wanted us to believe: that they were stronger than they were. Lacking friendly air fields and warm-water ports that couldn't be used as a chokepoint, the USSR went for ICBMs.
By the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis, it was apparent nuclear weapons couldn't be used in the same fashion as conventional ones. ICBMs of the time, especially Soviet ones, were inaccurate and unreliable. Hitting hardened targets was impossible and many missiles would fail to work; this problem was even worse for SLBMS.
Our strategy changed from "Massive retaliation" to "Flexible Response", focusing more on destroying military targets than cities, chief among them the nuclear forces of the other superpower. Bombers were slower but considered more accurate and flexible. Submarines were horribly inaccurate, but in theory, undetectable by either side. In reality, both sides hunted down the other's submarines, conventional and nuclear.
By the 1970s, ICBMs had grown accurate enough to hit hardened targets and the introduction of MIRVs meant most larger bombs were retired. They were too big to be practical weapons and you could cause far more devastation with several small bombs than one big one. Soviet warheads tended to be larger than their American counterparts, relying far more on ICBMs. Out of 11,000 strategic weapons we possessed at the end of the decade, only around 2,200 were based in missile silos. Contrast this to the Soviets having 5,000 out of 7,000 on their ICBMs.
Air defenses had advanced to the point where the majority were unlikely to make it through, on either side. To mitigate this, we developed long-range missiles that had a range of over 1,000 miles, allowing more survivability against enemy defenses. Even now, accuracy was such that hardened targets would need multiple warheads to destroy, hence the term: "overkill". If one warhead had only a 50% chance to destroy a target, you'd deploy 3-4.
At the end of the decade, the Soviet Union deployed the SS-20, an intermediate range, MIRV capable, ballistic missile. Some feared this could destroy every air field and communications center in Europe with minimal warning, leaving them helpless against Soviet aggression.
In response, we deployed the Pershing II and the Ground Launched Cruise Missile. Far more accurate than their predecessors, these could destroy every missile silo west of Moscow. Combined with the Tomahawk deployed in naval vessels, this switched the balance of power to the United States.
The rationale of possessing an enormous stockpile is that, in real life conditions, only a fraction of those weapons would actually be used against something. Many would be destroyed on the ground, or in port, and at least some missiles would fail. Even a near-miss against a missile silo might disable the missile, even if it's not destroyed. 3-4 warheads against an air field would destroy 200 warheads, as would sinking a submarine, on the open ocean or in port. The USSR's submarines were more detectable than NATOs, so you start running out of warheads pretty fast, as the situation chances from moment to moment.
As things stand now, even our SLBMs are accurate enough for a devastating first strike with a 100 kiloton warhead. Both the U.S. and Russia have around 1,600 operational warheads, with more targets than the number of missiles that would actually get through. China has at least several hundred of their own.
Our missile defense system is still limited but rapidly advancing. THAAD has around 332 interceptors and the AEGIS system possesses several hundred more. While they can't shoot down everything, thanks to decoys and malfunction, the attacking party would run into the same issues.