by Reality Check » Wed Aug 01, 2012 8:45 pm
Two interesting studies were done during the 1980s when the United States Department of Defense was being revitalized.
One of these studies was an automated simulation of the United States mobilization that occurred during World War II.
The other was a federally mandated update to the Civil Defense plans of each metropolitan area.
Many local areas used a new and modern Civil Defense planning strategy to save time and money. The Civil Defense plans of the 1950s and 1960s were built around the shelter in place concept. The "new and modern" planning method called for populations to be relocated from "risky metropolitan" areas to "safe metropolitan areas". This re-location strategy avoided the need to update existing shelters and build more shelters to accommodate increased populations. The results of these local plans, when aggregated at the national level, were very interesting.
One simple example illustrates the most interesting key points. In the state of Washington there are two small cities that are near the east-west center of the state. One is located in the southern part of the state. The other in the northern part of the state.
The small southern city, Yakima, had previously been informed it was a key communications hub and a key railroad hub of the United States and was therefore a strategic target. Yakima planned to re-locate it's population to a small sleepy city in the northern part of the state known mostly as an agricultural center.
The small northern city, Wenatchee, had previously been informed it was a key communication hub and a key railroad hub of the United States and was therefore a strategic target. Wenatchee planned to re-locate it's population to a small sleepy city in the southern part of the state known mostly as an agricultural center. Of course the people of Yakima were planning to move to Wenatchee and the people of Wenatchee were planning to move to Yakima.
Virtually every rail road and almost every highway in the state of Washington passes through the eastern Washington cities of Yakima, Wenatchee, Spokane, or the inland ports of Pasco, WA or Lewiston, Idaho. Virtually all distribution centers in the eastern part of the state are collocated within one of those transportation hubs. Without the transportation infrastructure of those cities the eastern two thirds of the state that is rural farmland can not deliver food to the one fifth of the state that is urban, high density population centers and sea ports, on the west side of a major mountain range. All the towns and cities of eastern Washington state are also dependent on the distribution centers located in those five eastern Washington transportation hubs. Geography, history and economics dictate the location of these key infrastructures. The huge concentration of population on the west side of the state which was not killed when a strategic nuclear strike destroyed the sea ports, the centralized water and power infrastructure, and other key strategic targets on the west side, would starve to death while entertaining themselves fighting over the ever diminishing, limited food supply not destroyed when the west-side distribution centers were destroyed along with the sea ports and other west-side transportation hubs.
The other study was an automated attempt to duplicate the mobilization of the United States that occurred during World War II.
During the 1970s various U.S. military commands developed automated systems to plan, schedule, implement, and monitor, in real time, the movement of material, supplies and personnel needed as part of military exercises to test the ability of the United States to reinforce the defense of some part of Europe or some part of Asia. These automated systems were not fully integrated with each other, so, for instance the Airlift automated system did not know what parts of the United States civilian transportation system the Sea-Lift automated system was planning on using, and the Army Logistics automated system was equally blind. Individual exercises were also very limited in scope and duration compared to a full blown mobilization.
The World War II simulation tied these automated systems together and attempted to duplicate what actually happened during World War II.
Multiple attempts at doing this failed. The automated systems, when tied together, reported that the civilian transportation systems created plans that simply did not work in the real world. The same problem existed if the civilian transportation system that existed in the 1980s was used for the simulation.
The old men who, as young men, had actually accomplished the mobilization in the 1940s were then located and brought in as consultants. These veterans were very impressed with the automated systems and suggested it would have been much easier if they had them available in the 1940s. It was then pointed out to them that the automated systems did not work. They strongly disagreed. They said the systems were reporting exactly what they found to be true in the early 1940s.
The problem was that thousands of transportation managers in the 1940s, and all of the automated systems in the 1980s were using the rail capacities of the individual rail lines used in the civilian sector for planing. In fact multiple rail lines use the same transportation loading and unloading infrastructure at key choke points at ports and inland rail hubs where all the rail lines pass through the same transportation hubs. The entire U.S. transportation system must be managed, balanced, and fine tuned as a single transportation system based on the limitations of these shared infrastructure choke points.
The United States strategic war plans are based on the lessons learned during World War II conventional strategic bombing campaigns. The United States knows how to utterly destroy an industrial society by utterly destroying hundreds of key infrastructure sites that the entire non-agrarian portion of the society is dependent on for their very existence. Thousands of strategic thermonuclear weapons deliverable by ballistic missile, or cruise missile, simply allows the United States to do this in hours, not the months or years that would have been required in World War II.
To spell it out the vast majority of the population in an industrial society resides very near the urban population centers. If the transportation system that delivers food to these people is utterly destroyed, then they die. It has nothing to do with blast radius or which direction the wind blows from the blast craters.
These United States strategic war plans have existed for over 40 years. The Chinese have stolen both the U.S. strategic thermal nuclear weapons designs and the U.S. strategic war plans. The Chinese leaders know very well what would happen to their industrial society, their political power, and their families if they initiated a Strategic Nuclear War with the United States.
The United States leaders also know what would happen if hundreds of Chinese strategic thermal nuclear weapons, properly targeted, were detonated in the United States.
Fear is as good a motivator as greed.
Two interesting studies were done during the 1980s when the United States Department of Defense was being revitalized.
One of these studies was an automated simulation of the United States mobilization that occurred during World War II.
The other was a federally mandated update to the Civil Defense plans of each metropolitan area.
Many local areas used a new and modern Civil Defense planning strategy to save time and money. The Civil Defense plans of the 1950s and 1960s were built around the shelter in place concept. The "new and modern" planning method called for populations to be relocated from "risky metropolitan" areas to "safe metropolitan areas". This re-location strategy avoided the need to update existing shelters and build more shelters to accommodate increased populations. The results of these local plans, when aggregated at the national level, were very interesting.
One simple example illustrates the most interesting key points. In the state of Washington there are two small cities that are near the east-west center of the state. One is located in the southern part of the state. The other in the northern part of the state.
The small southern city, Yakima, had previously been informed it was a key communications hub and a key railroad hub of the United States and was therefore a strategic target. Yakima planned to re-locate it's population to a small sleepy city in the northern part of the state known mostly as an agricultural center.
The small northern city, Wenatchee, had previously been informed it was a key communication hub and a key railroad hub of the United States and was therefore a strategic target. Wenatchee planned to re-locate it's population to a small sleepy city in the southern part of the state known mostly as an agricultural center. Of course the people of Yakima were planning to move to Wenatchee and the people of Wenatchee were planning to move to Yakima.
Virtually every rail road and almost every highway in the state of Washington passes through the eastern Washington cities of Yakima, Wenatchee, Spokane, or the inland ports of Pasco, WA or Lewiston, Idaho. Virtually all distribution centers in the eastern part of the state are collocated within one of those transportation hubs. Without the transportation infrastructure of those cities the eastern two thirds of the state that is rural farmland can not deliver food to the one fifth of the state that is urban, high density population centers and sea ports, on the west side of a major mountain range. All the towns and cities of eastern Washington state are also dependent on the distribution centers located in those five eastern Washington transportation hubs. Geography, history and economics dictate the location of these key infrastructures. The huge concentration of population on the west side of the state which was not killed when a strategic nuclear strike destroyed the sea ports, the centralized water and power infrastructure, and other key strategic targets on the west side, would starve to death while entertaining themselves fighting over the ever diminishing, limited food supply not destroyed when the west-side distribution centers were destroyed along with the sea ports and other west-side transportation hubs.
The other study was an automated attempt to duplicate the mobilization of the United States that occurred during World War II.
During the 1970s various U.S. military commands developed automated systems to plan, schedule, implement, and monitor, in real time, the movement of material, supplies and personnel needed as part of military exercises to test the ability of the United States to reinforce the defense of some part of Europe or some part of Asia. These automated systems were not fully integrated with each other, so, for instance the Airlift automated system did not know what parts of the United States civilian transportation system the Sea-Lift automated system was planning on using, and the Army Logistics automated system was equally blind. Individual exercises were also very limited in scope and duration compared to a full blown mobilization.
The World War II simulation tied these automated systems together and attempted to duplicate what actually happened during World War II.
Multiple attempts at doing this failed. The automated systems, when tied together, reported that the civilian transportation systems created plans that simply did not work in the real world. The same problem existed if the civilian transportation system that existed in the 1980s was used for the simulation.
The old men who, as young men, had actually accomplished the mobilization in the 1940s were then located and brought in as consultants. These veterans were very impressed with the automated systems and suggested it would have been much easier if they had them available in the 1940s. It was then pointed out to them that the automated systems did not work. They strongly disagreed. They said the systems were reporting exactly what they found to be true in the early 1940s.
The problem was that thousands of transportation managers in the 1940s, and all of the automated systems in the 1980s were using the rail capacities of the individual rail lines used in the civilian sector for planing. In fact multiple rail lines use the same transportation loading and unloading infrastructure at key choke points at ports and inland rail hubs where all the rail lines pass through the same transportation hubs. The entire U.S. transportation system must be managed, balanced, and fine tuned as a single transportation system based on the limitations of these shared infrastructure choke points.
The United States strategic war plans are based on the lessons learned during World War II conventional strategic bombing campaigns. The United States knows how to utterly destroy an industrial society by utterly destroying hundreds of key infrastructure sites that the entire non-agrarian portion of the society is dependent on for their very existence. Thousands of strategic thermonuclear weapons deliverable by ballistic missile, or cruise missile, simply allows the United States to do this in hours, not the months or years that would have been required in World War II.
To spell it out the vast majority of the population in an industrial society resides very near the urban population centers. If the transportation system that delivers food to these people is utterly destroyed, then they die. It has nothing to do with blast radius or which direction the wind blows from the blast craters.
These United States strategic war plans have existed for over 40 years. The Chinese have stolen both the U.S. strategic thermal nuclear weapons designs and the U.S. strategic war plans. The Chinese leaders know very well what would happen to their industrial society, their political power, and their families if they initiated a Strategic Nuclear War with the United States.
The United States leaders also know what would happen if hundreds of Chinese strategic thermal nuclear weapons, properly targeted, were detonated in the United States.
Fear is as good a motivator as greed.